Liquidity and resolution of uncertainty in the European carbon futures market by Kalaitzoglou, Iordanis Angelos & Ibrahim, Boulis Maher
Liquidity and resolution of uncertainty in the European
carbon futures market
Iordanis Angelos Kalaitzoglou, Boulis Maher Ibrahim
To cite this version:
Iordanis Angelos Kalaitzoglou, Boulis Maher Ibrahim. Liquidity and resolution of uncertainty
in the European carbon futures market. International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier,
2015, 37, pp.89-102. <10.1016/j.irfa.2014.11.006>. <hal-01107956>
HAL Id: hal-01107956
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01107956
Submitted on 9 Feb 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de




Liquidity and Resolution of Uncertainty in the European Carbon 
Futures Market 
 
Iordanis Angelos Kalaitzoglou 
Audencia School of Management, Pres LUNAM, CFRM, Nantes 44312, France 
e-mail: ikalaitzoglou@audencia.com 
Boulis Maher Ibrahim 
Accounting, Economics and Finance, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14 4AS, UK 
e-mail: b.m.ibrahim@hw.ac.uk, Tel: 00 44 (131) 451 3560 
 
Abstract 
We investigate whether liquidity introduces or helps resolve uncertainty in Phase 
I and the first year of Phase II of the European Carbon futures market. We propose 
a distinction between ‘absolute’ or overall liquidity and that which is ‘relative’ to 
a benchmark. For this purpose, we suggest volume–weighted duration as a natural 
measure of trading intensity as a proxy for liquidity, and we model it as a rescaled 
temporal point process. The new model is called Autoregressive Conditional 
Weighted Duration (ACWD) and is shown to outperform its discrete modelling 
counterparts. Liquidity is found to play a dual role, with higher relative liquidity 
introducing uncertainty and higher absolute liquidity accelerating uncertainty 
resolution, thus, enhancing market efficiency. 
 
JEL Classifications: C41, C46, G14, Q40 






This paper investigates whether liquidity introduces or facilitates the resolution of uncertainty. 
If liquidity is linked to, or convey, information (Easley and O’Hara, 1992) some uninformed 
traders who observe variations in liquidity might believe that there is price unresolved 
information. Accordingly, some relative levels or variations of liquidity might induce 
uncertainty (price volatility). Upon greater ambiguity aversion the magnitude of the resulting 
volatility shock(s) would be expected to be greater. If liquidity exhibits such conditionality, 
then higher liquidity episodes relative to ‘norm’ or benchmark levels (e.g., annual, daily, or 
hourly averages, or levels dictated by uninformed investors) may induce uncertainty, while 
high general norm or benchmark levels may help resolve uncertainty by accelerating 
uncertainty resolution time. In this paper we recognise this likely dual role of liquidity, and use 
it to motivate an explicit distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ liquidity, which may 
facilitate the determination of uncertainty. We model liquidity conditionality (parametrically) 
and use the trades of higher relative liquidity identified by this modelling to test (non–
parametrically) whether this conditionality affects volatility. 
From a microstructure point of view the market is seen as a price discovery and a liquidity 
provision mechanism (O’Hara, 2011), where information (Bagehot, 1971; Kyle, 1985; Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985) and liquidity (Tinic 1972; Tinic and West, 1972; Benston and Hagerman, 
1974) are the drivers of intraday price formation. Focusing on liquidity, relevant literature 
recognises a transitory effect on price formation due to ‘inventory holding’ (Garman 1976; 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Stoll, 1978; Ho and Stoll, 1981, 1983). Without disregarding 
this conventional role of liquidity, seen as a matching mechanism that results in transaction 
costs and is positively related to asset prices, O’Hara (2003) identifies a more complex role 
related to the risk of holding an asset. Specifically, systematic fluctuations in liquidity might 
be related to the presence of price unresolved information (Easley and O’Hara, 1992). This 
indicates that liquidity, as a non–price measure, conveys price related information 
(Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim, 2013b) and might thus affect perceptions of risk and risk premia. 
If this risk is not fully diversifiable across assets, liquidity leakage (O’Hara, 2003) might 
increase ambiguity–induced (Easley and O’Hara, 2010) volatility. 
The question that naturally arises is how sophisticated the trading patterns of various market 
participants are, and how they interact with each other. O’Hara (2003) argues that informed 
traders continuously move a partially revealing price equilibrium according to new 
information. Private or imperfect public information is continuously and partially revealed 
through trades. Further, public information, when not perfect, increases ambiguity and is not 
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immediately incorporated into prices. Due to ambiguity, therefore, not everybody perceives the 
same signal in the same way and, thus, prices need a period of time to adjust. During this 
uncertainty resolution period, some uninformed traders observe and ‘learn’ from trading 
history and act upon sufficiently strong accumulated information, according to their portfolio 
needs, given that there is enough time till the information gets price resolved. They become 
more informed to the remaining uninformed and can exploit the newly extracted information 
but only within a limited time window till their advantage becomes obsolete. Their actions 
temporarily increase liquidity, which might accelerate price resolution or increase uncertainty 
and hence volatility. Consequently, this uncertainty resolution period can be thought of as a 
‘time game’ among uninformed traders. Liquidity, therefore, cannot be considered 
independently from price discovery since they interact affecting price formation. The price 
discovery mechanism of the market can, thus, be seen as a continuously revealing price 
equilibrium, where information dissemination is not an instantaneous event but interacts with 
liquidity. Under this perspective, liquidity should exhibit some sort of conditionality. 
Furthermore, organised markets are seen as a diverse information aggregation mechanism 
(Kyle and Viswanathan, 2008), where liquidity might increase market efficiency (Hayek, 1945) 
without necessarily increasing ‘price accuracy’ too.1 According to  O’Hara (2003), they also 
seem to implicitly recognise multiple roles for liquidity. Overall liquidity is understood to 
improve market efficiency, since it enables the easier incorporation of price related signals into 
prices. This implicitly assumes that information held by better informed agents is revealed 
through trading signals and thus, conditionality in liquidity might induce uncertainty. In this 
paper we explicitly distinguish between ‘absolute’ liquidity, defined as the overall volume of 
trading, from ‘relative' liquidity, defined as different liquidity levels relative to a liquidity 
benchmark. We investigate liquidity patterns, where relative liquidity might induce 
uncertainty, the resolution time of which depends on absolute liquidity. 
The first contribution of this paper is the explicit modelling of trading intensity (proxy for 
liquidity) as a rescaled temporal point process. Engle and Russell (1998) describe the dynamics 
of inter–arrival time of events as a dependent point process, and model it with the 
Autoregressive Conditional Duration (ACD) model. However, duration alone is not always 
sufficient in describing the intensity of trading, and event time needs to be modelled along with 
other variables of interest called marks (e.g., trade price or trade volume/size). Following the 
                                                 
1 A less regulated, highly manipulated market might be more liquid and thus, more efficient, in terms of 
incorporating manipulation into prices, yet assets are not necessarily priced according to fundamentals. 
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Autoregressive Conditional Intensity (ACI) framework of Russell (1999), Tay et al. (2004) 
propose the Autoregressive Conditional Multinomial Duration (ACMD) model, which 
describes durations and associated marks as a temporal marked point process with discrete 
marks. Each state of a mark is thought of as a parallel point process, the realisation of which 
depends on past information. In parallel, Russell and Engle (2005) develop the Autoregressive 
Conditional Multinomial (ACM) framework, which jointly models arrival times and transition 
probabilities among the different stages of an associated discrete mark. The major limitation of 
these approaches is that marks with continuous distributions would require an infinite number 
of states.  
This paper, instead, shifts the focus from event (transaction) time to events defined by a unit 
change in an associated mark. We use a kernel transformation of the mark to weigh or rescale 
durations. This produces a new measure of the waiting time for the arrival of a unit quantity of 
the mark. The new framework is called Autoregressive Conditional Weighted Duration 
(ACWD), and is used to model volume weighted duration as a better measure of trading 
intensity than duration alone. The conditional intensity (hazard function) of this natural 
measure of trading intensity depends upon past transformed durations and measures the 
instantaneous rate of the arrival time of a single unit of the mark. This extends the ACD 
framework of Engle and Russell (1998) in the sense that it enables the modelling of a marked 
point process as a univariate temporal point process. 
The second contribution of this paper refers to the explicit distinction between ‘absolute’ 
and ‘relative’ liquidity and their differential impact on volatility and uncertainty resolution. We 
investigate the intraday volatility impact of high trading intensity episodes in Phase I (2005-
2007) and the first year of Phase II (2008-2012) of the European Carbon market, identified in 
Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013a). This market consists of distinct organised exchanges and 
trading phases with notably different, but increasing, levels of overall liquidity for the same 
commonly traded contracts. The total supply of traded emission allowances and credits is 
regulated (capped) and, even though allowances could not be carried forward from Phase I to 
Phase II (‘banking restriction’), there has been an over allocation of allowances since market 
inception, affecting prices and liquidity.2 This provides an ideal setting for investigating 
potentially different effects of the two types of liquidity defined above. In more detail, the new 
model allows for a deeper insight on the creation, magnitude and length of these episodes, 
                                                 




because it focuses on a richer measure of trading activity as a proxy for liquidity. An increase 
(decrease) in volatility levels following a high trading intensity trade would indicate the 
introduction (resolution) of price relevant information, and this would capture the volatility 
impact of high relative liquidity. We further investigate the intraday resolution time of the 
volatility impact of high trading intensity trades. A shorter (longer) resolution period, when 
overall liquidity is higher, would indicate that higher absolute liquidity leads to increased 
(decreased) market efficiency, in the sense of faster information dissemination and uncertainty 
resolution. 
To the extent that volume and duration convey information and liquidity, and inform 
subsequent bid and ask price quote setting, the new measure of volume–weighted duration 
relates directly to four of the five overlapping dimensions of liquidity: immediacy (speed of 
order execution, clearing and settlement), resiliency (the speed with which prices recover from 
a random uninformative shock), tightness (the cost of turning around a position within a short 
period of time) and depth (the size of an innovation in aggregate quantity traded). It may relate 
indirectly to breadth (numerous large orders) which could translate, at least partially, to faster 
large or block trade execution.3 As higher ‘general’ trading activity is usually associated with 
greater depth and lower trading costs (O’Hara, 2011; and Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim, 2013b), 
tightness and depth would be partially accounted for by a trading intensity measure, even 
though the direction of causality (from spreads or depth to trading intensity, or vice versa) may 
not be clear in a duration model without an explicit price dimension, such as the one suggested 
here, although it could be extended to include this dimension.4 
The results indicate that there exist strong liquidity momentums, which drive intraday 
trading activity and price change volatility. Relatively higher trading intensity seems to be 
followed by increased volatility, which needs at least 7 minutes to be price resolved. These 
uncertainty shocks seem to be smaller in magnitude and to be absorbed relatively faster in more 
liquid environments. This highlights a major difference between absolute and relative liquidity. 
                                                 
3 Hence we include block trades in our data sample. For definitions of the rather ‘slippery’ concept of liquidity 
see, e.g., Kyle (1985), Grossman and Miller (1988) and Ranaldo (2001). 
4 Asymmetric information microstructure models attribute trading costs, including the bid–ask spread, to 
interacting information (‘permanent’) and liquidity (‘temporary’) related components that are further dissected 
into order processing, asymmetric information, inventory–carrying (immediacy), and oligopolistic market 
structure costs (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). Obviously, if price quote setting follows a ‘learning’ process from the 
recent evolution of order flow then the speed and size of trades would inform subsequent (variable) trade cost 
setting, and hence prices. 
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Higher relative liquidity is linked to higher presence of information and introduces uncertainty, 
while higher absolute liquidity contributes to market efficiency, in the sense of lower in 
magnitude, faster absorbed shocks.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; Section 2 presents the methodology, 
Section 3 describes the data collection and manipulation, Section 4 discusses the empirical 
findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Time Rescaling  
Let {𝑡0, 𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑛, … } with 𝑡0 < 𝑡1 < ⋯ < 𝑡𝑛 < ⋯ , 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, be the sequence of arrival times 
of a type of event, such as transactions, of an asset A. N(t) is the counting function, counting 
the number of events occurred by time t and 𝑚𝑖~(?̅?, 𝜎𝑚
2 ), 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 denotes an associated mark. 
Assuming that both the realisation time and the mark 𝑚 are conditional on past history 𝐹𝑖 ≔
(?̌?𝑖, ?̌?𝑖), i.e., a σ-algebra on 𝛺 = {𝑇𝑥𝑀}, where ?̌?𝑖, ?̌?𝑖 is the history of 𝑡 and 𝑚 up to event 𝑖, 
and they formulate a temporal mark point process (henceforth t.m.p.p.) {(𝑡𝑖, 𝑚𝑖)} on {𝛺, 𝐹𝑖 , 𝑃}, 
where 𝑃: 𝐹 → [0,1] is a mapping of 𝐹 on [0,1]. The conditional joint density function of 
{(𝑡𝑖, 𝑚𝑖)} is (𝑡𝑖, 𝑚𝑖)|𝐹𝑖−1~𝑓(𝑡𝑖, 𝑚𝑖|?̌?𝑖−1, ?̌?𝑖−1; 𝑐), where c is a vector of parameters. The 
conditional expectations of arrival time and the associated mark can be derived from the 
marginal density functions; 𝐸[𝑡𝑖|𝐹𝑖] = ∫ 𝑡
 
𝑇





In this paper, we shift focus from transactions to a unit quantity of associated marks. In the 
majority of the market microstructure literature, the arrival time of events focuses on the arrival 
of transactions or the submissions of orders. However, in some cases, such as inventory 
position adjustment (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1980), execution risk (e.g., Cohen et al., 
1980, 1981), or regret free price quotation (e.g., Madhavan et al., 1997), the waiting time up to 
a certain event, other than the transaction itself, might be of greater importance. A convenient 
measure could be the accumulated magnitude of mark, 𝑚, i.e., 𝜉(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑖,0<𝑡𝑖<𝑡 , over (0, 𝑡).
5 
Relevant literature (e.g., Tay et al., 2004) suggests the modelling of the conditional intensity 
function of the t.m.p.p. as the collection of discrete temporal point processes (henceforth t.p.p.). 
Despite allowing for the derivation of the marginal density functions, this approach is restricted 
                                                 
5 For example, a trader who submits a large order is exposed to execution risk due to insufficient liquidity or 
market depth. In this case, she should be more interested in how long it is expected to take for a certain quantity 
of the underlying asset to be traded, rather than what is the expected waiting time till the next transaction. 
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to a finite number of states of the associated mark, with the transition probabilities assumed to 
follow a Markov chain. However, when the aggregated magnitude of a continuous mark is of 
interest, the modelling of 𝐸[𝜉(𝑡)] would be more convenient. Depending on the independence 
assumptions among the marks and the arrival times, 𝐸[𝜉(𝑡)] could be described by various 
specifications (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2003). The expected aggregated magnitude of the 
associated mark over a period of time could be defined as the expected number of events times 
the expected value of the mark. Consequently, 𝐸[𝜉(𝑡𝑖)|𝐹𝑖−1] could be defined as 






 𝑓(𝑚𝑖|𝐹𝑖−1)𝑑𝑚, where λ(·) is the 
conditional intensity of arrival time. 
In this paper we suggest an alternative formulation of 𝐸[𝜉(𝑡𝑖)|𝐹𝑖−1], by rescaling the arrival 
time, t, of  a certain event (e.g., transaction) with associated marks, to the arrival time, t*, of a 
unit quantity of the associated mark. Assuming that the magnitude of the mark of the last event 
(e.g., transaction) can be spread out in the time between two subsequent events, this is the 
mapping 𝑡∗: 𝑇 ⨯ 𝑀 → 𝑇, where ( 𝑡𝑖, 𝑚𝑖) → 𝑡𝑖
∗ ≔ 𝑡𝑖𝑔(𝑚𝑖) and 𝑔(𝑚𝑖) is a function of the 
associated mark. The sequence {𝑡0
∗, 𝑡1
∗, … , 𝑡𝑛
∗ , … } with 𝑡0
∗ < 𝑡1
∗ < ⋯ < 𝑡𝑛
∗ < ⋯ , 𝑡∗ ∈ 𝑇 is a t.p.p 
and refers to the arrival time of a unit quantity of the associated mark (e.g., how long it takes 
for price to change one tick, or for one unit of volume to be traded, …, etc.). Consequently, the 
expected accumulated quantity of the mark over (0, 𝑡) would simply be the expected value of 
the counting process 𝑁(𝑡∗), thus 𝐸[𝜉(𝑡𝑖)|𝐹𝑖−1] = 𝐸[𝑁(𝑡𝑖
∗)|𝐹𝑖−1]. The rescaled process could 
be fully described by its conditional intensity measure, which, assuming a function Y, is given 













. This describes the probability of a unit mark (e.g., one contract 
or one tick price change) to occur, given that it has not so far. 
2.2 Autoregressive Conditional Weighted Duration (ACWD) 
The new formulation proposed follows the ACD model of Engle and Russell (1998). First, 
let 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖−1 denote the (raw) duration of event i, measured by the time (t) elapsed since 
the preceding event at i-1, while 𝑥𝑖 denotes the diurnally adjusted duration. We suggest using 
the normalised mark 𝑔(𝑚𝑖) = 𝐾(𝑢𝑖), as a scaling factor for the duration realisation process, to 
formulate a new weighted duration variable 𝑧𝑖, with 𝜃𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑧𝑖|𝐹𝑖−1). 
Consequently, the temporal marked point process (𝑥𝑖, 𝑚𝑖) is transformed into a temporal 
point process (𝑌{𝑥𝑖, 𝑚𝑖}), with density function (𝑌{𝑥𝑖, 𝑚𝑖}|𝐹𝑖−1) = (𝑧𝑖|𝐹𝑖−1)~𝑓(𝑧𝑖|?̌?𝑖−1; 𝜑), 
where ?̌?𝑖−1 is the history of z up to time i-1 and φ is a vector of parameters. In more detail, 
using the following density kernel, 𝑧𝑖 could be defined as:  
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 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝐾(𝑢𝑖) (1) 




 𝑢𝑖 = (𝑚𝑖 − ?̅?)/𝜎𝑚. (3) 
The choice here of kernel, 𝐾(𝑢𝑖), is motivated by three advantages. First, the exponential 
functional form accelerates (decelerates) time of transactions with a mark above (below) the 
mean mark (?̅?). Thus, it ‘discounts’ or ‘compounds’ duration by the distributional position of 
the mark relative to the mean. Second, 𝑢𝑖 is a normalisation (z-score) of the mark and this 
preserves the shape of the mark distribution (i.e., skeweness and kurtosis would still be present 
if the mark’s distribution is skewed with fat tails). Finally, this normalisation smoothes or 
reduces mark intra-day seasonality.6 The new variable (i.e., weighted duration, 𝑧𝑖) measures 
the waiting time for the realisation of a unit mark. We model 𝑧𝑖 as: 
 𝑧𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖𝜀𝑖 (4) 
 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃(𝑧𝑖−1, … , 𝑧1; 𝜑1) (5) 
 𝜀𝑖|𝐽𝑖~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑., 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓(𝜀𝑖|𝐽𝑖; 𝜑2) and 𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝐽𝑖; 𝜑2) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑖) = 1 (6) 
where 𝑧𝑡 is the weighted duration, calculated as in Eq. (1), 𝜃𝑖 is the expected value of 𝑧𝑖, 𝜀𝑖 
is the error term, 𝐽𝑖 is an economically relevant threshold variable and φ’s are sets of 
parameters.  This model allows for various empirical specifications for the conditional mean 
and the distribution to better fit the stylised facts of the market under investigation.  
2.3 Instantaneous Liquidity 
Although various marks can be used, we focus on non–price trading information and the 
associated mark of interest is trade volume or size (i.e., number of contracts), 𝑣𝑖. Consequently, 
the transformed variable is 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝐾(𝑢𝑖), where 𝐾(𝑢) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−𝑢𝑖 
2
) and 𝑢𝑖 = (𝑣𝑖 − ?̅?)/𝜎𝑣. 
This variable is an explicit measure of trading intensity as a proxy for liquidity, and measures 
the waiting time for a single contract to be traded. The ACW for 𝑆𝑖 can be formulated as 𝑆𝑖 =
                                                 
6 A graph showing the reduction in seasonality is available from the authors. Many alternative kernels are also 
possible. The Gaussian, for example, is most commonly used for its desirable statistical properties (it has a 
bandwidth equal to the standard deviation), although the Epanechnikov kernel may have optimal convergence 
(most efficient) properties (see, e.g., Epanechnikov, 1969). 
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𝛩𝑖𝜀𝑖, where 𝛩𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑆𝑖|𝐹𝑖−1; 𝜑) = 𝛩(𝑆𝑖−1, … , 𝑆1; 𝜑1). Following Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim 
(2013b), the conditional mean is specified as 
 𝛩𝑖 = 𝜔 + ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑆𝑖−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝛩𝑖−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1 , (7) 
where 𝛩𝑖 is the conditional expected trading intensity, and 𝜀𝑖 is the so called standardised 
trading intensity, given by the ratio 𝑆𝑖/𝛩𝑖. The conditional density function is a smooth 
transition mixture of Weibull: 
 𝑓(𝜀𝑖|𝐽𝑖; 𝝉) =
(ℎ(𝐽𝑖: 𝝉) 𝑆𝑖⁄ )[𝑆𝑖𝛤(1 + 1 ℎ(𝐽𝑖: 𝝉)⁄ ) 𝛩𝑖⁄ ]
ℎ(𝐽𝑖:𝝉)exp (−[𝑆𝑖𝛤(1 + 1 ℎ(𝐽𝑖: 𝝉)⁄ ) 𝛩𝑖⁄ ]
ℎ(𝐽𝑖:𝝉)), (8) 
where, 
 ℎ(𝐽𝑖: 𝝉) = 𝛾1 + (𝛾2 − 𝛾1) ∗ 𝐺1(𝐽𝑖: 𝑔1, 𝑗1) + (𝛾3 − 𝛾2) ∗ 𝐺2(𝐽𝑖: 𝑔2, 𝑗2), (9) 
 𝐺𝑘(𝑆𝑖: 𝑔𝑘, 𝑗𝑘) = (1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝑔𝑘 ∗ (𝐽𝑖 − 𝑗𝑘)})
−1. (10) 
The shape parameter, ℎ(𝐽𝑖: 𝝉), of the mixture of Weibull distribution is a function, h, of the 
threshold variable, Ji, which we represent by the first lag of S, and a vector of parameter 
coefficients τ = (γ1  γ2  γ3  g1  g2  j1  j2), where, γ1, γ2, and γ3 are the shape parameters of the 
Weibull distributions in three regimes of low, medium and high trade intensity determined by 
the two threshold values j1 and j2 of the threshold variable Ji, and gk (k=1,2) is the smoothness 
parameter between regimes. For every observation the overall shape parameter of the 
distribution ℎ(𝐽𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖−1: 𝝉) is the weighted average of the shape parameters in the three 
regimes, γ1, γ2, and γ3.7 The weights are determined by two smooth transition functions, G1 and 
G2. Consequently, the conditional intensity (hazard function) of weighted durations, i.e. the 
probability of a single contract to be traded given that it has not so far, is revised after every 
transaction, providing a measure of instantaneous liquidity.   
This modelling provides richer specifications for the conditional intensity over discrete 
mark models, such as the ACMD of Tay et al. (2004) and the ACM–ACD of Russell and Engle 
(2005). In Tay et al. (2004) only marks with discrete distributions are employed and the 
associated durations are treated as parallel, independent point processes. The ACWD model 
relaxes the independence assumption, by allowing a simultaneous modelling of both 
                                                 
7 The values that the shape parameters take on have direct implications on the arrival rate of unit marks (single 
contracts). If γi = 1, the associated distribution is Exponential and the hazard function is approximately flat. This 
indicates a rate of arrival of a single contract  that does not change over time. If γi < 1, the Weibull distribution 
and the associated hazard function  have a monotonically decreasing slope. This indicates increased probability 
of a single contract to be traded closer to the realization of the last event. Finally, if γi > 1, the Weibull distribution 
is bell–shaped and the hazard function has an upward slope. This indicates that the probability of a single contract 
arrival increases over time. The rates are only revised after the next transaction is observed. 
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continuous time and continuous marks. The latter is also a marginal improvement over ACM, 
which only allows discrete marks to be considered.8  
Estimation is conducted by maximising the log–likelihood employing the Broyden, 
Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno (BFGS) algorithm with numerical derivatives and 
heteroskedasticity robust errors. The model is compared to two parsimonious specifications of 
the ACM–ACD and ACMD models. All models are fitted using the Box–Jenkins methodology 
and relative performance is further tested through in– and out–of–sample forecast accuracy, as 
additional ‘goodness of fit’ tests. (See the technical appendix for competing models, 
forecasting setup and performance comparison measures.) 
3. Data 
3.1 The European Carbon Market9 
Liquidity and its volatility impact are of particular importance in young and relatively 
illiquid markets, such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).  This 
market exhibits some features that distinguish it from other markets. It employs a ‘cap and 
trade’ system, where overall supply is politically regulated. This aims at a gradual increase in 
prices, which should function as an incentive for reducing overall emissions. It is a relatively 
new market that has gradually gained liquidity, with growing numbers of participants and 
overall trading volume.10 Therefore, absolute liquidity is expected to contribute to higher 
market efficiency. In contrast, market participants can trade the same standardised futures 
contracts (European Union Allowance–EUA–futures) in overlapping trading mechanisms. 
This market structure allows for liquidity and information exchange across trading venues. 
Phase I Trading pattern variations might temporarily affect price formation due to liquidity 
inflow, or permanently move prices as a result of pertinent information becoming available. 
                                                 
8 There is a trade-off between the two approaches. The modelling of marked durations using only discrete states 
allows for the specification of the marginal distributions of both the duration and the states. In contrast, the ACWD 
models marked durations as a single variable. The joint distribution is the distribution of a single variable, and the 
conditional intensity (hazard function) depends on its past. The marginal distributions of duration and the mark 
are indistinguishable, but this allows for the modelling of marks with continuous distributions in a convenient 
way. 
9 See the European Commission Climate Action website <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm>, 
Convery and Redmond (2007) and Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) for further coverage on this market. 
10 See, e.g., the growth in trading volume, the utility sector, and aviation inclusion (from January 2012) in reports 
of organisations such as the World Bank (Cappor and Ambrosi, 2006; accessible at 
<https://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/>), and Mansanet–Bataller and Pardo (2008). 
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Consequently, fluctuations in relative liquidity might have an opposing effect to absolute 
liquidity by inducing noise and/or price relevant information.11 An explicit modelling of trading 
activity should contribute to identifying potentially different price impact of absolute and 
relative liquidity. 
Although early literature evidently ignores the intraday trading activity dynamics, recent 
studies highlight its contribution to price discovery and market maturity. Mizrach and Otsubo 
(2014), for example, report that increasing liquidity in EU ETS is associated with increasing 
price impact. Ibikunle et al. (2011) contend that this is not necessarily generated by increased 
volume, but more likely by higher trading frequency. Bredin et al. (2014) confirm the price 
impact of duration, but report a negative contemporaneous correlation between volume and 
volatility. They conclude that liquidity effects dominate informed trading price impact. 
Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013a) further investigate this issue and provide empirical evidence 
that high trading intensity shocks induce increased trading activity episodes, mainly due to 
increased volume. Independently of their link to contemporaneous volatility, high trading 
intensity trades seem to induce higher volatility. Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013b) also 
investigate the informational content of various levels of trading intensity and report that higher 
levels are associated with more information, which is mainly revealed by more frequent 
trading. They also highlight that learning speed of market participants does change, which is 
expected to affect the duration of high trading intensity price change volatility shocks. 
However, none of the above studies explicitly models trading intensity, or investigate the length 
of the intraday volatility innovations induced by high trading intensity trades. Both of these 
issues are the key focus of the empirical analysis of this paper. 
3.2 Data Sample 
The data employed in this study refers to the EUA futures contracts with December 2008 
maturity traded on the two largest exchanges of the EU ETS: the European Climate Exchange 
(ECX) and Nord Pool (NP) (see Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim, 2013a). This contract is chosen 
because its maturity spanned the period from market inception in January 2005 to December 
2008 and, hence, brackets the whole of the pilot Phase I and the first year of the commitment 
                                                 
11 Along the same lines, Viswanathan (2010) argues that regulation is necessary in order to restrict manipulation, 
but also to enhance liquidity. A non-regulated, non-transparent market would be liquid, but still inaccurate in 
terms of pricing. In contrast, a strictly regulated environment would increase price accuracy, but may decrease 
liquidity. Both results would counteract the underlying purpose of emission reduction. 
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Phase II, and was the most heavily traded, by far.12 Liquidity levels are distinctly different 
between phases (as is discussed in Section 4.1), and the especially low levels of Phase I make 
this phase particularly pertinent to examine the role of liquidity on the determination of 
uncertainty. The sample consists of all recorded transactions of the main trading sessions 
(08:00–18:00 and 08:00–15:30 Central European Time in ECX and NP, respectively) from the 
official opening of the market on 1 January 2005 till 31 December 2008.13 The marks of interest 
are date, time stamp, transaction price and transaction volume (size). The following filters are 
applied: all observations from the year 2005 are omitted due to very thin trading and all 
transactions out of the official trading hours are excluded. Durations are computed in seconds 
and the data has been organised as a continuous trading session. All zero durations are omitted 
and all associated marks aggregated to the first subsequent transaction. Omitted outliers are: 
all observations with durations longer than the official trading hours or longer than the mean 
plus five standard deviations, or that can be graphically considered as outliers; and all 
observations with volume larger than 500 contracts (to account for recording discreteness).14 
Finally, durations are diurnally adjusted as in Engle (2000) to account for intraday seasonality. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results  
                                                 
12 In addition, ‘banking’ restrictions, that disallowed carrying allowances forward from Phase I to Phase II had a 
greater role to play in the liquidity of contracts with other maturities (e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2009). The December 
2008 contract was the only contract available for trading throughout the entire sample period from market 
inception to the end of 2008. These market periods will henceforth be referred to by ECX I, ECX II, NP I and NP 
II. 
13 The Kyoto Protocol defines three periods for countries to meet their emission reduction targets. Phase I (2005–
2007) is the pilot period, Phase II (2008–2012) is the commitment period and Phase III (2013–2020) is the post 
commitment evaluation period. For in–depth descriptions please refer to Mansanet–Bataller and Pardo (2008) and 
the IETA annual reports (2005–2009). Trading hours in NP were extended in June 2005 from 09:00 (10:00) to 
15:30 CET in March (February). 
14 Our data includes normal screen (the majority), block (indicator ‘k’), exchange for physical (EFP) and exchange 
for swap (EFS) trades. The latter two are classified as over–the–counter (OTC) trades. The minimum, maximum 
and average volume (size) of block trades are 50, 300 and 83 contracts, respectively. The same numbers for OTC 
trades are 9, 500 and 26 contracts. There were only 9 (of 66855) trades in ECX I, 31 (of 145860) trades in ECX 
II and none in NP, with volume larger than 500 contracts. Beside their uncharacteristically high volume (700 to 
3000) these trades represent only 0.0135% and 0.0213% of trades in ECX I and ECX II, and hence their exclusion 
as outliers is unlikely to have a significant effect on the results.  
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4.1 Initial Observations 
A quick inspection of Table 1 reveals that liquidity is significantly different between the 
two organised markets, but also between Phase I and Phase II. ECX is far more liquid with the 
average duration in both phases (375 sec. in Phase I and 75.73 sec. in Phase II) being 
considerably shorter than in NP (1912.21 sec. in Phase I and 1370.57 sec. in Phase II). The 
average transaction size appears to be rather similar. Furthermore, the distributions of the 
variables in ECX have a longer right tail (e.g., skewness is 11 in ECX I and 7.29 in ECX II but 
only 3.71 in NP I and 3.28 in NP II). In addition, Phase II appears to be more liquid than Phase 
I. The average duration is shorter in both markets in Phase II and, according to the standard 
deviation, observations are closer to the mean. Also, skewness and kurtosis of duration are 
smaller in Phase II, indicating less infrequent and large values. Consequently, absolute liquidity 
is notably higher in ECX than NP, and in Phase II than Phase I. 
Figure 1 presents the average price change volatility following different levels of trading 
intensity. Volatility is consistently higher after transactions associated with shorter durations 
and larger size. This is a sign that higher relative liquidity, in the form of faster and larger 
trades, is associated with greater in magnitude price changes. This is consistent with our initial 
claim that higher trading intensity might carry price unresolved information, which might 
induce uncertainty and, thus, increase volatility.  
The relatively low trading activity during the early stages of the market provides an ideal 
set up for investigating the different roles of liquidity.15 Specifically, the modelling of 
conditional liquidity identifies potentially differential effects of different levels of trading 
intensity on the arrival rate of single contracts. Focus, then, shifts to the volatility impact of 
high intensity trades and, hence, to the uncertainty inducement of higher relative liquidity 
trades. We next measure the uncertainty resolution period in calendar time in both markets and 
phases. There is a notable difference in absolute liquidity levels between the two markets, as 
well as between phases, with ECX and Phase II being a lot more liquid than NP and Phase I. 
Different speed of uncertainty resolution, linked to absolute liquidity, would indicate a distinct 
role thereof, as opposed to the role of relative liquidity.   
4.2 Continuous vs Discrete modelling 
Estimation results of the ACWD model (equations 7, 8, 9 and 10) are presented in the first 
five columns of Tables 2.A to 2.D. Almost all parameter estimates presented in the four tables 
                                                 
15 For the increasing levels of activity and market development, see, for example, IETA reports (2005–2009). 
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are statistically significant. In particular, estimates of alpha and beta for ACWD in all four 
tables add up to less than, but close to, one. This indicates stationarity with high persistence, 
underlying autoregressive dynamics, and hence the appropriateness of the ARMA/ACD 
modelling framework, for trading intensity. Thus, intensity shocks have prolonged subsequent 
effects, in the sense that a shock does not die out quickly, but persists over time. 
The STM–ACWD model investigates persistence, separating the impact of different levels 
or stages of trading intensity. The two threshold values j1 and j2 clarify the distribution of the 
errors as a mixture of three Weibull distributions, and define high, medium and low levels of 
trade intensity. Ji < j1 signals high trade intensity levels in the form of shorter weighted duration 
per contract; j1 < Ji <j2 signals medium trade intensity levels or medium weighted duration per 
contract; and Ji > j2 signals low trading intensity levels in the form of longer weighted duration 
per contract. As discussed in Section 2.3, each of these three levels of trade intensity is 
associated with a different Weibull distribution with a distinct shape parameter. These 
parameters are γ1, γ2, and γ3 for high, medium and low intensity levels, respectively. Estimates 
of the shape parameters are different from each other, confirming distinct levels or stages of 
trade intensity. Estimates of γ1 for high levels of trading intensity are consistently less than one 
(0.1895 in ECX I, 0.5038 in ECX II, 0.1954 in NP I and 0.2216 in NP II) implying a decreasing 
hazard function for the arrival of subsequent contracts. In this regime the probability of a single 
contract to be traded decreases over time and this means that when a large and/or fast trade is 
observed in the market the arrival rate of contracts accelerates. In contrast, when a slow and/or 
a small transaction is observed, as in the third level or stage of trading intensity, the estimate 
of γ3 is always very close to one. This implies an almost flat hazard function, which means that 
the arrival rate of a single contract is not expected to vary over time. Consequently, large and 
fast trading seems to accelerate trading activity, whilst small and slow trading seems to be 
prolonged. 
These findings confirm the existence of the trading episodes identified by Kalaitzoglou and 
Ibrahim (2013a). Easley and O’Hara (1992) and Engle (2000) argue that higher trading activity 
is associated with the presence of price unresolved information and thus, is linked to higher 
volatility. The decreasing hazard function following a high intensity trade indicates that trading 
activity intensifies. This might create an episode, which is expected to end when a low trading 
intensity shock, 𝜀𝑖, is observed, or when price relevant information is resolved. The volatility 
impact of these trades is investigated in the next section. 
The differential effect of each trade on the arrival rates of single contracts depends on the 
threshold values j1 and j2, as well as on the smoothness parameters g1 and g2. Estimates of j1 
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are consistently relatively small (0.1288 in ECX I, 0.0693 in ECX II, 0.0896 in NP I and 0.0544 
in NP II) compared to the theoretical mean of 1, which indicates a distinct group of trades with 
relatively short duration per contract. They account for less than 30% of total trading in all 
markets and phases. In contrast, the majority of trades, around 50%, lies beyond j2 (0.5829 in 
ECX I, 0.1098 in ECX II, 0.1989 in NP I and 0.2469 in NP II). The degree of the transition 
smoothness is captured by g1 and g2. Estimates of g1 are consistently less than those of g2 in 
Phase I (0.8999<1.7735 in ECX and 1.1545<1.7727 in NP), but consistently larger in Phase II 
(2.6499>1.6347 in ECX and 1.6524>1.1974 in NP). This indicates higher persistence of trading 
intensity following a large and/or fast trade in Phase I, which seems to return to a ‘normal’ 
stage, i.e. beyond j2, faster than it goes from a high to a middle trading intensity stage. In 
contrast, in Phase II, the high trading intensity episodes seem to be faster resolved into middle 
stage trading intensity, while the transition from middle to low is rather stable. Kalaitzoglou 
and Ibrahim (2013b) relate this to greater market depth and market maturity in Phase II. In 
Section 4.3 we investigate this further by measuring uncertainty resolution in calendar time. 
Faster resolution would indicate greater maturity. 
Furthermore, the above empirical findings are visually presented and confirmed in Figure 
2. When trading intensity is below j1, i.e. high trading activity, the probability density function 
(PDF) is sharply decreasing with an associated decreasing hazard function. Trading, therefore, 
is expected to continue being intense. In contrast, when trading intensity is around j2, the 
process seems to be reverting. When trading intensity is below j2, the PDF is bell-shaped 
indicating a higher probability of smaller and/or slower trading. When trading intensity is 
above j2, the density is still bell–shaped but closer to the Exponential distribution. This 
indicates a closer proximity to a flat hazard function and hence, more non–high–trading–
intensity trades. 
These findings are confirmed by the estimation of the two alternative discrete models, 
namely the ACMD and the ACM–ACD. For both of these latter models we use three states of 
the associated mark, the choice of which is guided by the unconditional basic statistics. The 
median volume is about 10 contracts, and this is defined as one state. The other two states 
consist of trades associated with less or more than 10 contracts, respectively. For consistency 
the Weibull distribution is employed. The ACM–ACD approach models the transition 
probabilities as time varying functions as in Equation 15 in the Appendix. The parameter 
matrices of interest are A and B, which indicate the structure of the transition matrix. Estimates 
of β (elements of B) are consistently high (e.g., 0.9167 and 0.8944 in ECX I) showing high 
persistence in volume continuation, i.e. the probability of a small (large) trade to follow a small 
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(large) one. This is confirmed by α’s (elements of A) where the probability of volume 
continuation (e.g., 0.2057 – a small trade follows a small trade – and 0.1759 – a large trade 
follows a large trade – in NP I) is higher than the probability of a reversal (e.g., -0.0870 – a 
small trade follows a large trade – and -0.0646 – a large trade follows a small trade – in NP I). 
This is also consistent with the estimation results of the ACMD (Equation 11 in the Appendix) 
where the transition probabilities are captured by the dissected intercept, 𝜔𝑐, of the three 
competing processes. Average duration is consistently shorter after a large trade (e.g., 0.0487, 
0.0377 and 0.0570 in ECX II), and consistently longer after a small trade (e.g., 0.0659, 0.2454 
and 0.3249 in ECX II). Consequently, all three models highlight that liquidity is persistent, in 
the sense that high trading intensity trades tend to be followed by larger and/or faster trades. 
Although the benchmark ACMD and the ACM–ACD models show the consistency of the 
ACWD in identifying the persistence of liquidity, there is a fundamental difference. These 
benchmark models require the states to be pre–specified, and persistence is shown above to be 
consistent with the chosen volume states of >10, 10 and <10 contracts. The possibility of mis–
specifying the states would, therefore, be a potential source of error. In contrast, the ACWD 
model has no need to identify states of the mark (volume), since the mark and duration are 
combined in one variable. In addition, the smooth transition mechanism (STM) feature of the 
STM–ACWD, with the two threshold values j1 and j2 (which are estimated jointly with the 
model), identifies relative levels of this new liquidity measure (trading intensity), while the 
ACMD and ACM–ACD specifications lack this feature.  
Another main result relates to the modelling approach, as well as the level of generality of 
the associated distribution required in order to take into account necessary features of the data’s 
higher moments, especially the joint distribution of durations and volume. In Table 3 we 
compare the performance of the models based on their in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecast 
accuracy. The values of Q–stat(15) are mostly insignificant for the ACWD models, ranking 
them as the best fitting models, especially the versions with the mixture of Weibull 
distributions. This indicates that the linear ACWD framework captures autocorrelation in both 
markets and both phases, and that the (1,1) lag structure is a parsimonious specification. 
However, for the ACMD and ACM–ACD models the reported significant Q–statistics indicate 
that some autocorrelation remains unaccounted for, or induced by the discrete character of 
these models. Further, increased flexibility of the density functions is rewarded with better 
ranking. The smooth transition mixture of Weibull distributions performs better than the 
Weibull (W), which in turn performs better than the Exponential (E). More importantly, the 
maximum log-likelihood function value (L) is significantly (statistically) greater for the model 
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estimated with the mixture of Weibull distribution than with the Weibull or the Exponential, in 
this order.16 Moreover, we use two measures to test relative forecast performance: the Unitised 
Loss (UNL), which is the average squared forecast error per unit of forecast value, and the 
correlation (CORR) between actual and forecasted values (see the ‘Performance’ section in the 
Appendix for more detail). According to these measures the ACMD is the worst of the three 
models, while the STM–ACWD is the best. These rankings suggest that the volume weighted 
duration modelling with the joint distribution better captures the data generation process of 
trading intensity, i.e. duration and volume, than the discrete marks approach. This is consistent 
across both in–sample and out–of–sample 1–step forecasts (see Appendix for more detail on 
forecasting setup). 
In contrast, the 10–step out–of–sample forecasts show that simpler density specifications 
should be preferred. These findings show that dependence on trading activity dynamics are 
more important for short term investment horizons, where higher complexity and/or flexibility, 
i.e. more flexible conditional density, are rewarded with higher forecasting accuracy. In 
contrast, trading activity seems to be less dependent on trading intensity persistence in the long 
term, and appears to converge to general long–term market dynamics, which are expected to 
follow macroeconomic fundamentals. Therefore, more parsimonious linear specifications tend 
to provide more accurate forecasts in the relatively longer term. This, again, highlights the 
differences between relative and absolute liquidity. Higher relative liquidity appears to create 
high trading intensity episodes, and that is why more complex distributions are better able to 
explain short–term dynamics. However, in the longer term the resolution of these episodes 
depends more on general market conditions, and thus on absolute rather than on relative 
liquidity. Therefore, the explanatory power of more complex distributions, which are more 
sensitive to trading intensity persistence, is dependent on relative market conditions. 
4.3 Intraday Uncertainty Resolution 
                                                 
16 The nesting property of the STM mixture of Weibull distribution to the Weibull and the Exponential 
distributions facilitates testing by the Likelihood Ratio (LR). For example, in Table 2.A the ACWD Log–
likelihood function values, L, are -21544.88 for a Weibull distribution and -21315.5 for the STM, giving a LR test 
statistic of 458.76, which is far larger than the 5% critical value of 12.59. This indicates that the ACWD model 
with the STM distribution is significantly better than with the Weibull distribution (both statistically and in terms 
of likelihood). Strictly speaking, the LR test cannot be used to test whether the ACWD fits better than the discrete 
mark models because these models are not nested.  
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Previous literature associates these liquidity episodes with increased price change volatility 
(e.g., Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim, 2013a). Trades characterised by higher relative liquidity have 
been implicitly reported to be associated with a higher presence of price unresolved 
information. In this paper, we accept that they might indeed convey price related information 
signals that are not yet reflected into price changes, and therefore trigger a high trading intensity 
episode. However, we investigate further cases where there might not be a general market 
consensus about the magnitude and the direction of the information. This, especially when 
private or imperfect public information and increased ambiguity co–exist, should introduce 
uncertainty in the form of increased volatility. More efficient market environments should 
incorporate information faster and, thus, shorten the duration of these episodes. We investigate 
whether higher absolute liquidity contributes to faster uncertainty resolution. Specifically, we 
focus on potential uncertainty induced by higher relative liquidity trades and investigate how 
different market environments absorb the shock. The main interest lies in the magnitude of the 
impact, on how long it takes for price change volatility to return to normal levels and how this 
changes over the trading day and across markets and phases. 
Figure 3 presents the average price change volatility for the five transactions that precede 
and the twenty that follow a high intensity trade (Ji <j1), at every hour of the trading day. 
Motivated by the microstructure literature that investigates the permanent and temporary price 
impact of trades (see e.g., Frino et al., 2010) we consider the prior five transactions as the 
‘current’ state of the market, while the length of the following window (twenty trades) is chosen 
according to the maximum length of impact found in our data. Beyond twenty transactions 
almost all effects of relative high intensity trades fade out. The first major finding from Figure 
3 is that notably higher volatility is observed for a time period following the appearance of high 
intensity trades. However, this volatility shock is not very sharp in magnitude and seems to be 
rather prolonged. This is a sign that higher relative liquidity is indeed perceived to carry price 
unresolved information, leading to increased volatility. However, there is no sharp price change 
that rapidly incorporates this piece of information into prices. Instead, depending on the time 
of day, a period of increased, or high and decreasing, volatility is observed when prices are 
gradually adjusted. Consequently, and in accordance with O’Hara (2003), information 
resolution is observed to be a gradual partially revealing process, rather than an instantaneous 
event. This prolonged uncertainty might create exploitable market frictions, which might attract 
increased trading. This is probably the reason why high trading intensity episodes seem to be 
prolonged, at least until price relevant information is resolved.  
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In addition, the average magnitude of the volatility impact of high trading intensity trades 
increases over the trading day, exhibiting the highest spikes towards the closing of the market. 
This is somewhat expected because the overall trading activity and the number of high trading 
intensity trades increases after the lunch break (see Figure 4) and less information resolution is 
expected towards the end of the trading sessions (Roll, 1984). Consequently, an unexpectedly 
large trade should be more distinct and more clearly linked to excessive information and hence 
it appears to have a higher price impact.  
Finally, Figure 5 presents the product of average duration during a high trading intensity 
episode and the number of transactions it takes for price change volatility to return to its prior 
‘normal’ level.17 This product measures, in minutes, the time it takes each market environment 
to absorb high trading intensity volatility shocks, and how this changes over the trading day. 
From Figure 5, the informational content of high trading intensity trades needs at least 7.65 
minutes (ECX II) to be resolved. Values of this measure vary over the trading day and across 
markets and phases ranging from 7.65 at the opening of the ECX II market, to more than 2 
hours during lunch break in NP II. Phase I in both markets is less liquid, and certain events 
affect trading activity more than in Phase II, while their effect seems to last longer. This is an 
indication of increased sensitivity to absolute liquidity or insufficient market depth, where 
certain events are noticeable. As market gradually gains liquidity towards Phase II these events 
have a lower volatility impact and are absorbed more smoothly and faster, which is interpreted 
as a more mature trading environment. Overall, the uncertainty resolution time is considerably 
shorter in ECX, especially in Phase II. This confirms that absolute liquidity is an important 
factor for uncertainty resolution, with ECX clearly leading, at least time wise, the intraday price 
discovery.  
In addition, the uncertainty resolution time consistently increases in all markets and phases 
until lunch break. This shows that there is accumulated overnight information that is resolved 
faster during the opening of the market because liquidity is higher and market participants 
appear to be more sensitive to high trading intensity shocks. After lunch break, however, the 
uncertainty resolution time decreases again, especially in NP. Following NP market close, the 
time length of uncertainty resolution in ECX drops drastically, especially in Phase I. This 
highlights the importance of the overlapping period, which seems to allow for information 
                                                 
17 We define as ‘normal’ the average price change volatility of the last five transactions prior to the appearance of 
a high trading intensity trade (Ji<j1). We then measure the number of transactions till subsequent price change 
volatility decreases for the first time below this ‘normal’ level. We repeat the process for every hour interval. 
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exchange or perhaps a cross–market liquidity influence.18 The flow of trades between the 
organised markets seems to prolong the uncertainty resolution time, probably due to increased 
ambiguity concerning the informational content of incoming trades. This indicates that, 
although ECX is markedly more liquid, NP also significantly contributes to intraday price 
discovery during the overlapping period, in the sense that investors seem to take into 
consideration that information and liquidity might flow from one market to the other. This is 
consistent with Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) who measure the informational share of both 
ECX and NP and indicate the leadership of ECX in intraday price discovery. 
Consequently, this analysis highlights a major difference between two distinct aspects of 
liquidity. Absolute liquidity, defined as the overall volume of trading, improves market 
efficiency, in the sense of lower in magnitude volatility shocks and faster uncertainty 
resolution. This might be related to lower execution risks or greater number of noise traders 
that allows dealers to recover potential losses by trading with better informed agents easier. In 
contrast, relative liquidity, defined as greater trading intensity compared to previous trades, is 
linked to price unresolved information and, thus, introduces uncertainty. 
This is further confirmed by the fitting of the models, where  the more sophisticated 
continuous ACWD specifications fit and forecast better in the short–term (1–step forecasts), 
while more parsimonious specifications are predominant in the long term (10–step forecasts). 
This indicates that trading momentums at intra-day level, which might induce liquidity or 
volatility shocks, are significant within a short time period, in which investors can extract and 
exploit temporal information advantages or arbitrage opportunities. In contrast, the temporal 
dependence of trading activity over longer time periods seems weaker, suggesting that it is 
driven more by exogenous stimuli, rather than by trading history. This difference highlights 
that there exists a time period when market frictions, such as relatively high trading intensity 
trades, could create exploitable opportunities due to increased ambiguity. However, when 
absolute liquidity increases, price liquidity is faster and therefore, potential market frictions are 
exploitable for a shorter period of time. This is a sign of higher levels of market efficiency. 
 
 5. Summary and Conclusion 
We propose volume weighed durations as a direct measure of trading intensity. We model 
the dynamic structure of this temporal marked point process (t.m.p.p) as a rescaled temporal 
                                                 
18 The ACWD framework, therefore, may be useful in studying cross–market or cross–asset liquidity. We thank 
an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention. 
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point process (t.p.p), weighted on the magnitude of the associated mark of interest. This 
provides a measure of the waiting time per unit of the associated mark. Consequently, we 
measure trading intensity as the waiting time of a single contract. This is a notable improvement 
over existing models, which model t.m.p.p’s assuming discrete state marks. The new 
framework, named Autoregressive Conditional Weighted Duration (ACWD), relaxes this 
assumption and is found to significantly outperform two existing models; the ACM–ACD 
model by Russell and Engle (2005) and the ACMD model by Tay et al. (2004). 
Furthermore, we employ a specification similar to Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013b) to 
identify different regimes of trading intensity in the European Carbon Futures market. We 
investigate whether distinctively high trading intensity trades introduce uncertainty by 
measuring their volatility impact. Then, the uncertainty resolution period is measured in 
calendar time, in the two largest exchanges of EU ETS, which differ substantially in overall 
liquidity. With this set up we propose a first time explicit distinction between two different 
types of liquidity, “absolute” or overall liquidity, which measures overall market activity, and 
“relative” liquidity, which measures relative market activity with respect to a benchmark, e.g. 
compared to average or absolute liquidity.  
Higher relative liquidity is found to introduce uncertainty, which is translated into higher 
price change volatility. The increased volatility does not “die out” immediately; it needs some 
resolution time. Uncertainty resolution times seem to be increasing from market opening until 
lunch break when they start decreasing. They drop drastically after the closing of NP, which 
indicates that price discovery takes place in both markets. This process is markedly faster in 
more liquid environments, such as the ECX, especially in Phase II. This indicates a dual role 
for liquidity; higher relative liquidity introduces uncertainty, while higher absolute liquidity 





Discrete State Modelling 
ACWD is tested against the following specifications:  
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 ℎ(𝜋𝑖) = 𝐾 + 𝐴(𝑐𝑖−1 − 𝜋𝑖−1) + 𝐵ℎ(𝜋𝑖−1), (15) 
where, 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 𝜓𝑖⁄ , x is realised diurnally–adjusted duration, ψ is its expected value, γ is the 
shape parameter of a Weibull distribution, and 𝐷𝑐,𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 when the associate mark of a trade i is in state c, and zero otherwise. Based on unconditional 
descriptive statistics we consider three states (c) of volume: <10, 10 and >10 contracts. For the 
ACM model, 𝜋𝑖 is the probability of the state of the associated mark, conditional on past 
information, and ℎ(·) is the inverse logistic function formulated in Equation 15 conditional on 
its past values and state probability. 𝜏𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐷 = (𝜔𝑐, 𝑎𝑐, 𝛽𝑐, γ𝑐) and 𝜏𝐴𝐶𝑀−𝐴𝐶𝐷 =
(𝜔, α, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝐾, 𝐴, 𝐵) are vectors of parameters, with 𝐴 = (
𝛼11 𝛼13
𝛼31 𝛼33
), 𝐵 = (
𝛽1 0
0 𝛽3
) and 𝐾 =
(𝑘1 𝑘3)′. 
 
One Step Forecasts 
‘Short–term’ (1–step) forecasts are generated according to the conditional mean specifications. 
We assume that the expected value of the associated mark of each state 𝐸𝑐,𝑖(𝜐𝑖+1) equals the 
unconditional expectation 𝐸𝑐(𝜐) in this state over the sample period. For the ACMD model we 
assume that the shortest duration defines the winning state (Kwok et al., 2009). The 1–step 










] for the ACMD, while for the 











], where 𝜋𝑖 =
exp (𝐾+𝐴(𝑐𝑖−1−𝜋𝑖−1)+𝐵ℎ(𝜋𝑖−1))
1+𝑖′exp (𝐾+𝐴(𝑐𝑖−1−𝜋𝑖−1)+𝐵ℎ(𝜋𝑖−1))
 and i′ is a conforming vector. 
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], where 𝜓𝜄+𝑠 = 𝜔
1−(𝛼+𝛽)𝑠−1
1−(𝛼+𝛽)












Models are first fitted using the Box-Jenkins methodology. The null hypothesis is that there is 
no remaining autocorrelation after 15 lags. The Q–stat (15) test statistic is distributed as a x15
2  
with a 5% critical value of 25. Performance is then tested further by examining the correlation 
(CORR) between the actual and the forecasted values of trading intensity and the Unitized Loss 
(UNL) for forecast accuracy. CORR measures the ability of the model to forecast large/small 
values when they are observed. Practically, it captures the ability of the model to forecast the 
level of liquidity. UNL measures the average squared error for every unit of forecasted values 
of performance used. It is defined as 𝑈𝑁𝐿 = 𝑀𝑆𝐸 ?̅̂?⁄ , where 𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
(1 (𝑁𝑇 + 1)⁄ ) ∑ (𝑋𝑖+𝑠−?̂?𝑖+𝑠,𝑖)
2𝑇−𝑠
𝑖=𝑅 . MSE is the mean squared error,  𝑋 is the realised trading 
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
                           
  ECX I ECX II NP I NP II 
  Duration Volume Price Duration Volume Price Duration Volume Price Duration Volume Price 
Mean 375.87 12.45 19.85 75.73 9.69 22.6 1912.21 10.81 20.33 1370.57 10.67 22.73 
Median 79 10 20.41 23 5 22.85 480 10 21.27 540 10 22.92 
Maximum 30979 500 33.72 4332 500 32.35 29933 250 33.5 20542 308 37.25 
Minimum 1 1 10.75 1 1 11.16 1 1 12.01 1 1 11.56 
Std. Dev. 1264.10 18.16 2.97 157.15 19.4 3.33 3727.12 11.77 2.99 2195.64 14.51 2.79 
Skewness 11 10.93 -0.37 7.29 11.02 -0.41 3.71 7.07 -0.64 3.28 9.28 -0.35 
Kurtosis 168.44 216.24 2.74 109.26 198.51 2.65 19.69 92.87 2.78 17.63 130.03 4.47 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for raw duration (in seconds), volume and price. ECX is the European Climate Exchange, NP is the Nord Pool 





Table 2.A Estimation Results for ECX I 
 
 ACWD STM–ACWD  W–ACM–ACD W–ACMD 
  E W Level 1 Level 2 Level 3   <10 >10 <10 10 >10 
            ct-1 <10 >10 <10 >10 <10 10 >10 <10 10 >10 <10 10 >10 
omega 0.0216 0.0353 0.0272  0.0287 0.0431 0.0186 0.0019 0.1611 0.0406 0.0146 0.1122 0.0556 0.0128 
 (3.88) (7.06) (8.79)  (8.90) (6.92) (3.96) (1.86) (6.54) (4.09) (4.15) (10.06) (5.07) (2.63) 
alpha 0.0962 0.148 0.1321  0.1795 0.2168 0.1807 0.1583 
 (5.43) (9.87) (14.18)  (8.40) (18.75) (19.82) (16.35) 
beta 0.8840 0.8149 0.8426  0.7962 0.6733 0.7916 0.8419 
 (40.37) (42.89) (34.67)  (52.99) (45.24) (43.54) (45.12) 
g1   0.8999 k -0.1793 -0.0908          
   (26.19)  (-14.44) (-9.36)          
g2   1.7735 α 0.1757 -0.0929 -0.0767 0.2119          
   (20.31)  (15.19) (-22.18) (-20.75) (15.61)          
j1   0.1288 β 0.9167 0.8944          
   (13.21)  (24.71) (22.38)          
j2   0.5829               
   (17.21)               
γ  0.6325 0.1895 4.0443 0.9105 γ 0.664 0.6067 0.6859 0.7213 
    (25.10) (22.14) (29.82) (25.74)   (26.47) (24.32) (21.84) (29.96) 
L -32270.37 -21544.88 -21315.95  -21576.65 -21066.45 
BIC 1.5156 1.0124 1.0031  1.0158 0.9934 
γ=1  29387.18 11198.65 5276.57 3.86  8816.91 13605.70 9296.71 3215.05 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Table 2.A presents the estimation results for ECX Phase 1 (ECX I). The first two columns present the estimates of the ACWD model with two 
progressively nested distributions (i.e. the Exponential and the Weibull). The following three columns present the estimates for the STM–ACWD 
model, which employs a smooth transition mixture of Weibull distribution, which nests the other two as special cases. The following columns present 
the estimation results for the ACMD (Tay et al., 2004) and ACM–ACD (Russell and Engle, 2005) models.  
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Table 2.B Estimation Results for ECX II 
 
 ACWD STM–ACWD  W–ACM–ACD W–ACMD 
  E W Level 1 Level 2 Level 3   <10 >10 <10 10 >10 
            ct-1 <10 >10 <10 >10 <10 10 >10 <10 10 >10 <10 10 >10 
omega 0.0468 0.0701 0.0621  0.0656 0.0659 0.0514 0.0487 0.2454 0.0098 0.0377 0.2349 0.1318 0.0570 
 (10.34) (11.30) (15.86)  (17.05) (19.07) (4.36) (5.79) (19.32) (1.00) (2.18) (19.45) (7.40) (4.52) 
alpha 0.1363 0.1855 0.1666  0.2373 0.2449 0.2165 0.2089 
 (16.87) (18.66) (24.23)  (18.11) (16.02) (13.55) (14.52) 
beta 0.8283 0.7508 0.7785  0.7123 0.6541 0.7529 0.7732 
 (68.24) (51.52) (58.41)  (57.90) (73.02) (56.23) (56.34) 
g1   2.6499 k -0.5333 -0.1801          
   (15.16)  (-19.71) (-9.77)          
g2   1.6347 α 0.5333 -0.1033 -0.0181 0.7215          
   (15.18)  (29.84) (-11.97) (-9.68) (14.62)          
j1   0.0693 β 0.7915 0.6999          
   (19.61)  (35.83) (21.61)          
j2   0.1098               
   (18.75)               
γ  0.6372 0.5038 1.7862 0.9848 γ 0.6578 0.6225 0.7224 0.7376 
    (32.74) (24.24) (19.58) (14.69)   (35.73) (41.36) (39.73) (37.66) 
L -83456.38 -61052.93 -60350.44  -60396.10 -59253.14 
BIC 1.8293 1.3384 1.3238  1.3251 1.3008 
γ=1  50007.34 6459.20 5677.37 1.85  5917.72 12867.57 5889.98 5457.37 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.03)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Table 2.B presents the estimation results for ECX Phase II (ECX II). The first two columns present the estimates of the ACWD model with two 
progressively nested distributions (i.e. the Exponential and the Weibull). The following three columns present the estimates for the STM–ACWD 
model, which employs a smooth transition mixture of Weibull distribution, which nests the other two as special cases. The following columns present 




Table 2.C Estimation Results for NP I 
 
 ACWD STM–ACWD  W–ACM–ACD W–ACMD 
  E W Level 1 Level 2 Level 3   <10 >10 <10 10 >10 
            ct-1 <10 >10 <10 >10 <10 10 >10 <10 10 >10 <10 10 >10 
omega 0.0565 0.0682 0.0585  0.0658 0.174 0.1264 0. 0307 0.1324 0.0497 0.048 0. 1784 0.0587 0.0425 
 (3.35) (4.07) (5.34)  (4.39) (3.87) (2.91) (2.82) (-3.17) (2.94) (3.53) (2.10) (2.18) (2.52) 
alpha 0.1628 0.2129 0.1771  0.1871 0.2225 0.2298 0.2309 
 (5.27) (5.51) (6.32)  (7.04) (7.04) (11.46) (7.46) 
beta 0.7932 0.7340 0.7708  0.74 0.6756 0.6166 0. 7196 
 (20.21) (16.23) (16.36)  (19.85) (19.17) (19.70) (19.97) 
g1   1.1545 k -0.2116 -0.0601          
   (17.44)  (-9.55) (-4.27)          
g2   1.7727 α 0.2057 -0. 0870 -0.0646 0.1759          
   (18.24)  (19.98) (-14.27) (-13.02) (15.43)          
j1   0.0896 β 0.9158 0.8930          
   (17.31)  (24.70) (24.02)          
j2   0.1989               
   (12.24)               
γ  0.5925 0.1954 4.4254 0.9685 γ 0.6018 0.6034 0.6576 0.6329 
    (10.19) (12.01) (10.61) (10.89)   (10.98) (10.52) (1.55) (10.74) 
L -3376.78 -2176.49 -2051.96  -2071.04 -1921.42 
BIC 1.7819 1.153 1.1005  1.1149 1.0492 
γ=1  4749.77 7486.53 6744.64 5.48  924.72 1582.42 832.87 504.85 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Table 2.C presents the estimation results for Nord Pool Phase I (NP I). The first two columns present the estimates of the ACWD model with two 
progressively nested distributions (i.e. the Exponential and the Weibull). The following three columns present the estimates for the STM–ACWD 
model, which employs a smooth transition mixture of Weibull distribution, which nests the other two as special cases. The following columns present 




Table 2.D Estimation Results for NP II 
 
 
 ACWD STM–ACWD  W–ACM–ACD W–ACMD 
  E W Level 1 Level 2 Level 3   <10 >10 <10 10 >10 
            ct-1 <10 >10 <10 >10 <10 10 >10 <10 10 >10 <10 10 >10 
omega 0.1101 0.1542 0.1161  0.1120 0.5413 0.3974 0.1491 0.3644 0. 3285 0.0583 0.3981 0.2119 0.0020 
 (1.92) (1.96) (2.61)  (7.33) (5.30) (5.18) (3.35) (4.65) (3.56) (1.96) (5.07) (2.68) (1.13) 
alpha 0.0968 0.1363 0.1085  0.1625 0.2003 0.2522 0.198 
 (3.15) (2.95) (4.00)  (7.89) (7.06) (5.86) (4.04) 
beta 0.8065 0.7277 0.7859  0.7139 0.5396 0.5651 0.5847 
 (10.21) (6.58) (11.86)  (9.74) (8.74) (9.83) (10.03) 
g1   1.6524 k -0.3447 -0.2392          
   (13.82)  (-11.25) (-15.79)          
g2   1.1974 α 1.1953 -0. 5044 -0.6099 2.2741          
   (14.17)  (7.63) (-8.91) (-14.25) (18.81)          
j1   0.0544 β 0.8956 0.7864          
   (15.53)  (17.24) (16.89)          
j2   0.2469               
   (15.96)               
γ  0.5979 0.2216 6.1974 0.8652 γ 0.6338 0.6242 0.6493 0.6615 
    (9.50) (18.17) (18.97) (20.61)   (22.20) (16.86) (14.68) (13.67) 
L -3818.78 -2761.02 -2633.17  -2557.75 -2515.10 
BIC 2.1248 1.5404 1.4832  1.4459 1.4358 
γ=1  4387.13 164.75 32291.7 7.84  3215.72 1171.47 691.48 353.41 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Table 2.D presents the estimation results for Nord Pool Phase II (NP II). The first two columns present the estimates of the ACWD model with two 
progressively nested distributions (i.e. the Exponential and the Weibull). The following three columns present the estimates for the STM–ACWD 
model, which employs a smooth transition mixture of Weibull distribution, which nests the other two as special cases. The following columns present 




Table 3.Trading Intensity, Q–stat (15) and In-Sample Performance 
  Q–stat (15)            
    Rank ECX I P-value Rank ECX II P-value Rank NP I P-value Rank NP II P-value 
ACWD 
E 3 8.23 (0.91) 3 6.26 (0.98) 2 1.24 (1.00) 3 3.17 (1.00) 
W 2 1.22 (1.00) 2 5.37 (0.99) 3 1.25 (1.00) 2 3.16 (1.00) 
STM–ACWD 1 0.40 (1.00) 1 4.59 (1.00) 1 1.15 (1.00) 1 3.13 (1.00) 
W-ACM–ACD 5 71.40 (0.00) 5 69.78 (0.00) 5 77.88 (0.00) 5 28.94 (0.88) 
W-ACMD 4 67.12 (0.00) 4 58.25 (0.00) 4 65.06 (0.00) 4 27.61 (0.94) 
 
   UNL        CORR        












E 3 7.4972 3 5.2873 3 2.9530 3 1.5438 3 0.3253 3 0.2179 3 0.3116 3 0.2080 
W 2 7.2839 2 5.2379 2 2.8882 2 1.5210 2 0.3502 2 0.2218 2 0.3118 2 0.2090 
STM–ACWD 1 6.9638 1 5.1546 1 2.3593 1 1.4370 1 0.3626 1 0.2310 1 0.3307 1 0.2100 
W-ACM–ACD 4 8.4493 4 6.9867 4 3.2812 4 1.5734 4 0.2671 4 0.2017 4 0.2944 4 0.1880 











E 3 7.2627 3 6.7554 3 8.2769 3 3.7380 3 0.0882 3 0.1728 3 0.1939 3 0.1033 
W 2 6.3353 2 5.5994 2 8.1989 2 3.5152 2 0.0921 2 0.1799 2 0.1971 2 0.1239 
STM–ACWD 1 6.1559 1 4.8021 1 7.9173 1 3.0387 1 0.0953 1 0.1826 1 0.2179 1 0.1421 
W-ACM–ACD 4 7.4320 4 6.9406 4 9.8608 4 3.9946 4 0.0818 4 0.1590 4 0.1920 4 0.0977 












E 1 2.7956 1 5.4895 1 3.6964 1 2.8947 1 0.0111 1 0.2578 1 0.0384 1 0.0539 
W 2 2.9078 2 6.4553 2 3.7362 2 2.9387 2 0.0100 2 0.2144 2 0.0366 2 0.0420 
STM–ACWD 3 2.9145 3 7.6463 3 3.7800 3 2.9486 3 0.0062 3 0.2031 3 0.0356 3 0.0325 
W-ACM–ACD 5 11.8853 5 25.7027 5 20.5339 5 20.1126 5 0.0013 5 -0.0025 4 0.0096 5 -0.0087 
W-ACMD 4 8.1354 4 22.7088 4 20.4245 4 19.8071 4 0.0017 4 0.0013 5 0.0084 4 -0.0080 
 
Table 3 presents the ranking of all models employed, namely the ACWD with the Exponential, the Weibull or a smooth transition mixture of Weibull 
distributions, as well as the ACMD and ACM–ACD with the Weibull distribution. The top panel reports the ranking according to Q–statistic, while the 
lower panel reports the ranking according to in–sample 1–step, as well as out–of–sample 1–step and 10–step forecasts, employing the unitised loss and 
correlation performance measures (explained in the appendix).  
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Figure 1. Trading Activity and Return Volatility 
A. ECX I B. NP I 
  
C. ECX II D. NP II 
  
Figure 1 presents the actual price change volatility after various stages of trading activity, at time t, across markets and phases. Price change volatility 






























































































































Figure 2. Trading activity and PDF of Volume Weighted Duration 
 
 
Figure 2 is a twenty–one trade extract from ECX I, where the trading intensity, i.e. volume 
weighted duration, of subsequent trades is plotted along with the associated probability density 
function (PDF) of the following trade. The two horizontal lines represent the threshold values 



















Figure 3. Price Change Volatility around High Trading Intensity Trades During the Day 
A. ECX I B. NP I 
  
C. ECX II D. NP II 
  
Figure 3 presents the actual price change volatility, √(𝑅𝑡)2, five transactions before and twenty transactions after a high trading intensity trade, across 






















































































































































Figure 4 presents the total number of trades during the day, across markets and phases, along 

























































































































Figure 5 plots the uncertainty resolution period, measured in calendar time (minutes), for both 
markets and phases. 
 
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
ECX I 17.22 51.38 51.60 66.55 67.96 48.29 34.94 43.13 20.63 18.59
ECX II 7.65 8.34 19.27 22.05 22.38 13.89 16.36 13.57 13.42 10.00
NP I 32.71 106.23 118.71 136.98 146.33 85.45 69.56 32.92
NP II 20.75 46.30 31.13 118.10 139.95 116.31 95.26 34.46
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